Responsabilidade: de suas bases conceituais para a sua aplicação prática em unidades de terapia intensiva by Teixeira, Carla Margarida et al.
 47
Acta Bioethica  2018; 24 (1): 47-56
RESPONSIBILITY: FROM ITS CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS TO 
ITS PRACTICAL APPLICATION IN INTENSIVE CARE UNITS
 
Carla Margarida Teixeira1, Ana Sofia Carvalho2, Sandra Martins Pereira3
Abstract: There has been a shift in the language of responsibility because the threat of malpractice litigation is encouraging 
physicians to assume a more responsible role in caring for their patients. Consequently, instead of paying attention to the 
moral dimension of this principle, professionals are sometimes much more concerned about legal repercussions. This article 
aims therefore at analyzing the recent literature on responsibility in intensive care, focusing on its ethical dimension. By 
analyzing the contributions of Emmanuel Levinas, Hans Jonas and Paul Ricoeur, who placed special emphasis on the theme 
of “moral responsibility”, we will attempt to shed some light on this ethical principle within the specific context of Intensive 
Care Medicine. This paper underlines the importance of responsibility in order to draw attention to the need to establish an 
appropriate balance between autonomy and self/other-oriented responsibilities. A tridimensional approach is suggested to 
frame responsibility within the context of intensive care.
Key words: professional ethics, clinical ethics, end-of-life care, decision-making, inter-personal relations, professional-patient 
relationship
Responsabilidad: desde el fundamento conceptual a la aplicación práctica en unidades de cuidado intensivo
Resumen: Ha habido un cambio en el lenguaje sobre la responsabilidad, debido a que la amenaza de demandas por mala 
práctica fuerza a los médicos a asumir un rol más responsable en el cuidado de sus pacientes. Por consiguiente, en lugar 
de prestar atención a la dimensión moral de este principio, muchas veces los profesionales están más preocupados de las 
repercusiones legales. Este artículo tiene como objetivo analizar la bibliografía reciente sobre responsabilidad en cuidados 
intensivos, enfocándose en la dimensión ética. Al analizar las contribuciones de Emmanuel Levinas, Han Jonas y Paul Ricoeur, 
que pusieron especial énfasis en el tema de la “responsabilidad moral”, tratamos de iluminar este principio ético en el contexto 
de la Medicina del Cuidado Intensivo. Este trabajo enfatiza la importancia de en dirigir la atención a la necesidad de establecer 
un balance apropiado entre la autonomía y las responsabilidades orientadas hacia uno mismo o hacia el otro. Se sugiere una 
aproximación tridimensional para enmarcar la responsabilidad en el contexto del cuidado intensivo.
Palabras clave: ética profesional, ética clínica, cuidado al final de la vida, toma de decisiones, relaciones interpersonales, 
relación paciente-profesional
Responsabilidade: de suas bases conceituais para a sua aplicação prática em unidades de terapia intensiva
Resumo: Tem havido uma mudança na linguagem da responsabilidade uma vez que a ameaça de litígio por imperícia está 
incentivando os médicos a assumir um papel mais responsável no cuidado de seus pacientes. Por conseguinte, em vez de prestar 
atenção à dimensão moral deste princípio, os profissionais algumas vezes estão muito mais preocupados com as repercussões 
legais. Portanto, este artigo visa analisar a literatura recente sobre responsabilidade nos cuidados intensivos, com foco em sua 
dimensão ética. Analisando as contribuições de Emmanuel Levinas, Hans Jonas e Paul Ricoeur, que deram ênfase especial sobre 
o tema da “responsabilidade moral”, vamos tentar lançar alguma luz sobre este princípio ético dentro do contexto específico 
da medicina de cuidado intensivo. Este artigo sublinha a importância da responsabilidade a fim de chamar a atenção para a 
necessidade de estabelecer um equilíbrio adequado entre a autonomia e responsabilidades orientadas para si e para o outro. 
Sugere-se uma abordagem tridimensional para enquadrar a responsabilidade para dentro do contexto de cuidados intensivos.
Palavras-chave: ética professional, ética clínica, cuidados terminais, tomada de decisão, relações interpessoais, relação 
profissional-paciente
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Introduction
The huge technical potential of Intensive Me-
dicine and its associated duties have created the 
need for an enhanced sense of responsibility and 
the development of new branches of medical re-
flection and education. Among these, the sustai-
nable management of resources and the ethical, 
social and scientific considerations concerning 
the limits for the intervention of intensive care 
medicine are paramount. Indeed, this sense of en-
larged responsibility leads us to question: What is 
responsibility? How does responsibility relate to 
intensive care medicine practices?
The process of deliberation, decision, and the as-
sumption of responsibility in relationship to one’s 
behavior is a function of the centered totality of 
[the individual’s] being(1). Thereby, this paper 
questions the balance between increasing choi-
ce and autonomy and paternalistic attitudes in 
ethical theories, and affirms the enormous impor-
tance of responsibility in order to draw attention 
to the need to establish an appropriate balance 
between autonomy and self/other-oriented res-
ponsibilities.
The aims of this article are therefore (i) to analyze 
the recent literature on responsibility in intensive 
care, focusing on its ethical dimension, and (ii) to 
reflect on the context of intensive care using the 
ethical foundations and reflexions of responsibi-
lity. Moreover, this paper questions the balance 
between increasing choice and autonomy and pa-
ternalistic attitudes in ethical theories, and affirms 
the enormous importance of responsibility in or-
der to draw attention to the need to establish an 
appropriate balance between autonomy and self/
other-oriented responsibilities.
In this article, terminologies, such as, “intensive 
care”, “intensive care medicine”, “critical care” 
and “critical care medicine” will be used inter-
changeably. 
Methods
We conducted a literature review with the widest 
possible scope, including national (Portugue-
se) and international (English, Spanish, French) 
journals on the ethical principle of responsibili-
ty. Databases, such as EBSCO (Elton B Stephens 
COmpany) Host, Pubmed, CINAHL (Cumu-
lative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Lite-
rature), WOS (Web Of Science) databases were 
searched with no limits established as our aim was 
not to perform a systematic review but to obtain a 
theoretical, comprehensive and integrative review 
of the state of the art to the investigated topic. 
This was complemented by a thorough search 
and analysis of manuals, books and book chapters 
written by renowned philosophers and authors 
from the field of bioethics and who dedicated a 
substantial part of their work to the ethical prin-
ciple of responsibility.
The context of intensive care medicine
The concept of Intensive Care (IC) that we will 
utilize as a background for the bioethical fra-
mework for responsibility can be defined as a 
multidisciplinary area in medical sciences that 
reports specifically the prevention, diagnosis and 
the way of dealing with situations of an intense 
illness potentially reversible in patients who pre-
sent a scarcity of one or more imminent or esta-
blished vital functions(2).
As from the end of the 20th Century, the 
physician’s capacity to intervene has increased 
enormously, without adequate consideration 
regarding the impact of this new reality on the 
quality of life of those critically ill. Critical care 
is an integral part of hospital care, and the inten-
sive care unit (ICU) is the setting where patients 
are given the most technologically advanced life 
sustaining treatments. Few areas of medical ethics 
raise such strong and diverse views on the issues 
regarding the end of life. In intensive care, as well 
as in other kinds of health care services, death and 
dying situations, previously private, traditionally 
spiritual or religious events involving family and 
friends, are in today’s world often public and te-
chnological. The severity of illness of hospitalized 
patients has progressively increased over recent 
decades, whilst sophisticated technological sup-
port has allowed such patients to survive longer. 
At the same time, it is becoming increasingly ac-
cepted that continued aggressive care may not 
always be beneficial. Death in the ICU, therefore, 
now frequently follows limitation of life-suppor-
ting therapies. As a result, the mission of the ICU 
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team has expanded to encompass the provision of 
the best possible care to dying patients and their 
families(3).  
Simon Blackburn stresses that all professionals 
must learn to become sensitive to the physical 
environment and to appreciate its fragility and 
how easily that can be destroyed. He also reminds 
us to be sensitive to what might be termed the 
moral or ethical environment and the climate of 
ideas relating to how we should live(4), in order 
for us to understand the motivations, reasons and 
feelings that affect us, and the network of rules 
or norms that support our lives, as far as possible 
the apparent jungle of principles and objectives 
needs to be structured. Clinical judgment requi-
res the integration of medical scientific concepts 
into observation and perception. Being responsi-
ve to evaluative complex situations requires being 
sensitive to the demands of evaluative reasons. 
It is known that critical-care decision making is 
highly complex, given the need for health care 
providers to consider and constructively respond 
to the diverse interests and perspectives of a varie-
ty of legitimate stakeholders (e.g., patients, family 
members, healthcare professionals)(5). 
This includes partly working out the combined 
effect of different factors that are in play at the 
same time. Therefore, ethical reflection on princi-
ples and good value judgment may be of utmost 
importance(6). This is also one of our goals, na-
mely to clarify the notion of responsibility as one 
of the main principles that must guide health 
professionals.
According to Ladrière(7), we recognize the ethics 
of a situation when it begins to collide with a 
question of “should it be?”. The way a situation 
wobble our perception of the “other” integrity (in 
its corporality, temporality, and relation to others) 
gives it an ethical meaning. The ethical situation 
is the one that causes dilemmas or problems in 
decision making.
In the ICU, there is an objective meaning, an 
existential meaning and an ethical one. We talk 
about objective meaning, since each patient is in 
a clinical situation and the most objective diag-
nosis and most suitable therapeutic intervention 
must be made. These therapeutic interventions 
are not merely technical because they involve the 
whole human being, with his/her individual life 
story. The ethical question in the context of the 
ICU is even more complex because this is where 
the patient is very often unable to express him-
self, to communicate and consequently unable 
to exercise his autonomy, implying dilemmas of 
decision-making at the end of life. The assump-
tion of responsibility for a person who formerly 
possessed the capacity for agency robs that indivi-
dual of essential elements of his or her humanity. 
Persons must be responsible for themselves; the 
responsibility cannot be delegated. Sartre mentio-
ned: “every man is in possession of himself as he 
is; this places the entire responsibility for his exis-
tence squarely upon his own shoulders”(8). Fur-
thermore, moral agents are responsible for what 
happens as a result of their choices. The process 
of deliberation, decision, and the assumption 
of responsibility in relationship to one’s beha-
vior is a function of the centered totality of [the 
individual’s] being(1). 
Responsibility in the philosophical context 
and its relation to critical care
The idea of responsibility has a long history, not-
withstanding its being a relatively recent con-
cept with a specifically moral dimension being 
attained only in the 20th century. The notion of 
responsibility was made explicit and generally ac-
cepted during the Middle Ages and used mostly 
as an adjective (“responsible” for an act or omis-
sion), not as an effective reality; in other words, 
morphologically like a noun (“responsibility”)(9). 
In etymological terms, the verb “to respond” is 
polysemic: res spondere, to engage oneself (sponde-
re) before somebody; to value (ponderare) the things 
(res). Res-pondeo: to respond with the meaning 
“to render account” (metaphorical meaning) or 
to make a reply in a law court.
The meaning of “responsibility” is, first and fo-
remost, juridical (an established responsibility) 
being divided into two branches: “penal respon-
sibility” with reference to suffering punishment 
and “civil responsibility” with reference to pa-
ying damages. According to Nordgreen(10), “in 
a moral context, responsibility would have then a 
metaphorical use with the double meaning of res-
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ponding to self-consciousness or to other people 
or, with the financial meaning, to render accou-
nt”.
We may say that there are several meanings of 
responsibility: the legal, the social, the moral, the 
professional, the political, and the historical. Res-
ponsibility could be viewed in terms of individual 
and societal. We take into account several mea-
nings of responsibility: “to assume responsibility”, 
“to attribute responsibility, “to have responsibili-
ty”, in the sense of obligation or duty (prospecti-
ve/retrospective); with a normative meaning: “to 
be a responsible person” (responsibility as a moral 
virtue).  
From the philosophical point of view, the inten-
tion is not to make moral judgments but to un-
derstand and clarify the meaning of “responsibi-
lity” in order to emphasize its importance in the 
context of medical ethics. In one sense, responsi-
bility can constitute a common platform for ethi-
cal behavior, since the relationship with the other, 
more fragile and vulnerable, is the condition that 
best develops the sense of responsibility in human 
beings(11). Regrettably, the term “vulnerable” too 
often gets played without any concrete meaning. 
Given the absence of agreed-upon standards for 
identifying and responding to vulnerability, a list 
of six types of vulnerability (cognitive, juridical, 
deferential, medical, allocational, and infrastruc-
tural), applicable to research subjects, have been 
proposed(12) and could also represent an ethica-
lly relevant features that bespeak vulnerability in 
the context of ICU care. The concept of vulnera-
bility is not central in this paper and we will not 
elaborate further on that. However, taking into 
account the list of the six vulnerabilities catego-
ries five of them (cognitive, juridical, medical, 
allocational, and infrastructural) could be easily 
recognized in the ICU context. Critical care is 
the setting where to acutely ill patients (medical), 
most of them not able to make an autonomous 
decision (cognitive, juridical), are given the most 
technologically and expensive advanced life sus-
taining treatments (allocational) in a very stressful 
environment (infrastructural).
Because of the several uses of the word “respon-
sibility”, which renders the terminology very di-
verse, there were authors who demanded a “res-
ponsibility grammar”(13). Incidentally, we draw 
attention to the fact that in some ethics dictio-
naries, the definition of Responsibility does not 
exist, namely in the ‘New Bioethics Encyclope-
dia’(14) (where other ethical bases and principles 
are defined), and even in philosophy dictionaries. 
Atlan(15) states that the word “responsibility” has 
no proper place in the Cambridge Dictionary of 
Philosophy. Therefore, bearing in mind that the 
principle of responsibility must be at the core of 
medical practice, in this article we analyze the 
contributions of some philosophers who have 
placed special emphasis on the theme of “moral 
responsibility”, and thus attempt to shed some 
light on this principle within the specific context 
of Intensive Care Medicine.
In the work of Paul Ricoeur we find an extensive 
ethical reflexion regarding the concept of respon-
sibility. To this author, responsibility exceeds the 
frame of compensation and punishment (of retri-
bution). It is under this meaning that nowadays 
the word is imposed in the moral philosophy to 
such an extent that it has become a “principle” in 
Hans Jonas and, in a great measure, in Emma-
nuel Levinas(16). Paul Ricoeur corroborates the 
concept of responsibility when he states that, for 
an agent, to act is to exercise power over another 
agent who then becomes a patient, i.e. the one 
who is the object of our intervention. It is in this 
unequal relationship between agents that ethical 
problems occur, because the power that might 
grow out of this dissymmetry could lead to per-
versions of the physician-patient relationship. 
This asymmetry establishes the ethical relations-
hip, which, if not abused, is not necessarily pro-
blematic. Therefore we should recognize the ethi-
calness of a situation according to the structure of 
the action. According to Ricoeur, it is the extent 
to which I act towards the other in a responsible 
manner that validates my ethical behavior(16). 
Emannuel Levinas emphasizes his concern with 
the Other. It is at that moment when “I am befo-
re” the Other, that the ethical question is settled, 
because the Other imposes that responsibility on 
me(17). An essential asymmetry is involved in 
this kind of relationship, particularly in the con-
text of critical care, in front of critically ill, vulne-
rable patients. Levinas endeavors to conceptualise 
the preconscious experienced responsibility for 
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the other, which is the fundamental ethical layer 
of the responsible self. According to Levinas, it 
is the rupturing of indifference that makes the 
“ethical event” possible. In fact, each one of us is 
responsible with a total responsibility, being res-
ponsible for all the others and for all that is of 
the others, even for our own responsibility. The 
“I” has always a greater responsibility than all the 
others(17). The simple fact of being human must 
lead to one’s preoccupation with the Other.  Le-
vinas endeavors to conceptualize the preconscious 
experienced responsibility for the other that is the 
fundamental ethical layer of the responsible self. 
It is at the moment when I assume my humanity 
that I recognize the Other´s humanity and beco-
me responsible for him or her. For Levinas, ethics 
happens, or not, when the self-certain ego beco-
mes disturbed, shaken and fundamentally ques-
tioned by the proximity, before me, of the abso-
lute Other(18). Therefore, the physician being 
confronted by the face of a critically ill “other”, 
his/her first ethical task is to accept the extraordi-
nary “otherness” of the patient, expressed by that 
patient´s visible vulnerability, which constitutes 
an ethical cry for help and care, and to fully assu-
me responsibility. 
Levinas’ ethics keeps redefining the terms of an 
unlimited personal responsibility that would start 
and end beyond ontology and therefore reach, 
beyond the Being of the other, the existent of 
the other’s radical otherness and thus the infini-
te humanity of humans beings(19). However, by 
sacrificing the possibility of building ethics on a 
reciprocal kind of relationship between me and 
the other, we must ask about the possibility of de-
veloping a medical ethics if one approaches to res-
ponsibility in the footsteps of Emmanuel Levinas. 
Therefore, because an insurmountable distance 
between the self and the Other, without the con-
cept of Aristotle Phronesis(20). Ricouerian pru-
dence Levinas’s approach to responsibility proves 
quite risky if applied to the practical context; this 
distance between the self and the Other could re-
present the denial of the responsibility(21).  
Hans Jonas, by declaring responsibility as an ethi-
cal principle, constitutes another landmark in the 
reflection on its moral dimension and in its im-
portance for the ethics in life sciences(22). Res-
ponsibility as imputation or accountability, in the 
classic sense, seems to imply a special relation to 
the past – to be considered responsible for a past 
action is to be ready to render account. The word 
“imputation” was commonly used long before the 
term responsibility. In this sense, «the one who 
signs the order is morally and legally responsi-
ble»(23). However, this definition of responsibi-
lity as imputation is a “minimal conception of 
responsibility” that doesn´t fit-in with the pro-
blem of human action in the technological age, in 
which what is demanded is guidance openly di-
rected towards a distant future that surpasses the 
more limited ability to foresee more immediate 
consequences. Jonas talks about responsibility in 
a much more all-encompassing sense. 
The concept of responsibility by Hans Jonas 
could be identified in the context of intensive care 
in two different roots: the responsibility towards 
future generations (of all future patients) and the 
responsibility towards the future of each patient 
in particular (of my patient, the Other in front of 
me in his/her uniqueness and vulnerability)(22).  
The most sensitive mission that one can entrust 
to an agent who is declared responsible for the 
future is the protection of some fragile, perisha-
ble reality.  The concept of “intergenerational jus-
tice” by John Rawls and Hans Jonas focuses on 
this idea(24). It includes both questions of social 
justice between different generations, within the 
same life cycles (intra-temporal intergenerational 
justice) and also in a long-term perspective (inter-
temporal intergenerational justice). The concepts 
of intergenerational justice currently discussed di-
ffer in the extent to which the present generation 
is expected to make provisions for future genera-
tions. The most common criticism when it comes 
to utilitarian models of intergenerational justice 
focuses on the expectation that earlier genera-
tions should make sacrifices in order to improve 
the welfare of future generations is that it could 
represent an intolerable unfairness of intergene-
rational distribution; therefore, Aristotle Phrone-
sis(20) or Ricoeurian prudence must be applied in 
order to guarantee that the obligations of earlier 
generations do not exceed defined limits of reaso-
nableness. Even if, from an ethical point of view, 
this standard could be considered minimalistic 
the current generations are oblige to preserve the 
stock of available resources and to secure, even, 
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this minimum standard of sustainability. 
Until recently, a period in an ICU was deemed a 
success if patients survived up to being discharged 
from the ICU. As critical care has evolved, it has 
become evident that understanding long-term 
survival, morbidity and quality of life (QOL) 
after critical illness is as important as dealing 
with short-term survival(25). Understanding the 
consequences of critical illness informs preventi-
ve measures that can be integrated into patient 
management and enable improvements in the 
quality of care. Whatever model is chosen, appro-
priate follow-up for survivors of intensive care, 
their families and healthcare teams/professionals 
is worth pursuing. So, in this context, responsibi-
lity is a social relationship of equal and reciprocal 
recognition of rights, which, in order to operate, 
requires an established context in which the true 
story behind how an act occurred can be ascertai-
ned. It implies both reciprocity and accountabi-
lity(26). A new concept of accountability is also 
required: one that is rooted in a shared concept of 
truth that sets out how agents must take respon-
sibility for the long-term effects of their current 
activities. Therefore, physicians´ responsibility 
concerning patients’ difficulties following criti-
cal illness and the willingness of intensive care 
teams to accept extended responsibility during 
the recovery period have led to the development 
of different follow-up programs which are in line 
with the concept of responsibility for the future 
proposed by Jonas. 
According to Schramm and Kottwo(27), Em-
manuel Levinas and Hans Jonas are two highly 
significant landmarks for the reflection regarding 
the moral dimension of responsibility and its im-
portance for ethics. The former explains ethics 
as responsibility; the latter affirms responsibility 
towards the future. Hans Jonas’ concern for ma-
cro-responsibility with the “Human Being” and 
Emmanuel Levinas’ concern for micro responsi-
bility with the “Other” share common features, 
since both result from an explicit request from 
vulnerable beings or others. 
In “Le Juste”, Ricoeur states that the essay is cau-
sed by the kind of perplexity left by the examina-
tion of the contextual, contemporaneous uses of 
the word responsibility(16). He also states that, 
nowadays, we still feel responsible for the others, 
for the environment, for ourselves, for all the 
most vulnerable; we are also responsible for those 
other who are in our care. Here we establish a 
link with responsibility in the ICU.  Physicians´ 
responsibility for the vulnerable in their hands in 
the ICU must consist of taking decisions regar-
ding what is best for the individual. Therefore, 
their main ethical obligation must be to take all 
their decisions having regard to the most solid 
and up to date scientific concepts. In circumstan-
ces in which the individual is most vulnerable, as 
happens in the ICU, the responsibilities of the 
health team are greater, in that they are going to 
be involved in deciding and acting upon what 
is best and most suitable on behalf of somebo-
dy else.  Whenever appropriate, the construction 
of the decision should envelop the patient, his 
or her relatives, the health professionals and the 
family doctor. However, the responsibility of the 
decision belongs to the physician in charge of the 
team that takes care of the patient(28). 
According to Paul Ricoeur, I am responsible for 
the other vulnerable person/human being(16). It 
extends to the relation between the author of the 
action and the one that suffers it, to the relation 
between the agent and the patient of the action. 
The direct object of responsibility expands to the 
fragile, to the vulnerable one. It is from the other 
in his fragility, more than from our own judg-
ment, that the moral responsibility comes. The-
re is a second displacement of the responsibility, 
more related with Jonas´s responsibility towards 
the future, related to the unlimited extension of 
the responsibility´s reach; the man´s future vul-
nerability and his environment as a preoccupa-
tion of responsibility(16). 
Responsibility versus autonomy in the context 
of intensive care
In former times, patients relied on physicians to 
tell them what to do when faced with a medical 
decision, and for the most part, the latter gladly 
accepted this responsibility. Eventually (however), 
patients and physicians came to realize that this 
paternalistic approach to medical decision-ma-
king placed far too much power in the hands of 
physicians, however beneficent their intent(29). 
 53
Acta Bioethica  2018; 24 (1): 47-56
The individualistic model of medical decision 
making, the so-called “autonomy paradigm”, has 
achieved prominence in the United States, and 
also plays a significant role in the countries of 
Anglo-Saxon culture. The reliance of the medical 
community on patient-centered decision making, 
serving as the cornerstone of informed consent, 
has been referred to by Pellegrino as a “cultural 
artifact” which may lead to complications and 
interference with the care of certain patients, par-
ticularly those from countries and cultural groups 
in which the family or other social unit plays a 
more pivotal role in treatment decisions(30). 
The promise of increased choice is now one of 
the key influences on new medical technologies. 
Despite the high regard for the principles of pa-
tient autonomy in most North American and Eu-
ropean countries, in reality most patients are too 
ill or too sedated to participate meaningfully in 
decision-making in the ICU(31). Evidence shows 
that patients are rarely involved in the decision-
making process concerning end of life decisions 
in intensive care units, mainly due to their lack 
of capacity in assessing and making the decision 
adequately(32-34).  
Most of the time, decisions are made by physi-
cians who, depending on the context, may or may 
not involve other healthcare professionals and su-
rrogate decision-makers in the decision-making 
process. Hence, a shared decision-making takes 
place, most of the time, having physicians, other 
healthcare professionals and families as stakehol-
ders. This process, however, can be experienced 
by family members with a high degree of psycho-
logical distress and suffering, and family members 
may not always fully understand the information 
given by professionals(5,35).  
Different studies from both the United States and 
Europe challenge the concept of shared decision-
making and question the quality and validity of 
this process(35,36). Furthermore, most surrogate 
decision-makers for ICU patients wanted to sha-
re decision-making responsibility with physicians 
and that overall they were satisfied with their de-
cision-making experience(37). Greater autonomy 
also involves greater responsibility concerning the 
options taken by the patient or the health profes-
sional(38,39). However, the relationship between 
the two principles is much more profound and 
complex. On this point, it is essential to repla-
ce the concept of autonomy by the concept of 
responsible autonomy(40). Relational accounts 
encourage clinicians to consider patients’ au-
tonomy in decision-making situations. In our 
opinion this relational component of autonomy 
is just the same as the aforementioned concept 
of responsible autonomy being aligned with the 
so-called “alternative model of autonomy”, i.e., 
relational autonomy. This concept highlights the 
social and interpersonal extend within all indivi-
duals exist and acknowledges the emotional and 
embodied aspects of decision-makers(41-44). A 
relational autonomy approach takes full consi-
deration to the central role of ‘others’, including 
their narratives(45), in the decision-making pro-
cess, highlighting the complex dimension and 
framework of end of life decisions and including 
physicians and health professionals’ role and their 
responsibility. 
Conclusion
As presented throughout this article, the principle 
of responsibility in the context of intensive care 
medicine can be analyzed and framed within a 
philosophical contour, as the one underlined by 
the three philosophers previously quoted. This 
contour can be defined into three distinct cate-
gories, which are linked to philosophical approa-
ches and reflections about responsibility, namely: 
current, future and retrospective responsibility. 
Current responsibility involves the physician’s 
duty to act in a responsible manner in the imme-
diate situation. Future responsibility involves eva-
luating the post-ICU patient situation, resulting 
from the interventions of health professionals du-
ring patients’ ICU treatment. Retrospective res-
ponsibility involves post-evaluation of the actions 
previously undertaken together with team reflec-
tions concerning appropriate treatment choices. 
All these forms of responsibility are interconnec-
ted. The question here is how far a physician is 
responsible, not only for the current effects of his/
her action, but also for the possible future effects, 
as well as for the prevention and the avoidance of 
possible future occurrences(1,38,39). 
According to the Levinas´s ethics of hospitality, 
we are in an impossible situation where we have 
continually to ‘‘compare the incomparable’’- the 
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“Other”. The hierarchy of values can no lon-
ger ‘simplify’ ethics for us. The insurmountable 
weight of our ethical responsibility is exactly what 
gives to hospitality its force. To live a moral life in 
the shadows of the difficulty of decision-making 
is to realize that the decision is terrible; clearly 
we must make very difficult choices regarding 
someone´s day-to-day life(18). 
Nordgreen presents us with a proposal suggesting 
what responsible professionals should do both as 
individuals and as communities(10). The moral 
responsibility of the ICU professional must be to 
find common ground or even a common ethical 
platform, in order to build a consensual policy for 
people with different values and principles.  Paul 
Ricoeur perspective includes both Levinas and 
Hans Jonas’ theories.
Following the reasoning of the aforementioned 
authors, we might suggest that this idea of res-
ponsibility in the context of intensive care me-
dicine could be applied across three dimensions: 
First, to the object of responsibility, “the other” 
(similar to the Levinasian formulation) who is 
in a situation of vulnerability, fragility, in a cri-
tical circumstance, often unable to communicate 
either due to the effect of his own illness or due to 
the effects of necessary medication or treatments. 
Second, to the responsibility in the future (similar 
to the Jonassian designation), either concerning 
this patient follow-up or of the others who may 
come to need an intervention in intensive care. 
Finally, to the prudence that must be exercised in 
decisions through recourse to admission and care 
guidelines of patients in the intensive care unit 
and through the assessment of patient outcomes 
(similar to the aristotelic prevision).
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